The paper aims to analyze the effects of plague on the long-term development of Italian cities, with particular attention to the 1629-30 epidemic. By using a new dataset on plague mortality rates in 49 cities covering the period 1575-1700 ca., an economic geography model verifying the existence of multiple equilibria is estimated. It is found that cities affected only by the 1629-30 plague recovered in the short run, whereas cities affected by both the 1575-77 and 1629-30 epidemic show persisting decline in the long run. This new finding contrasts previous literature and is hence interpreted in the light of the new concept of "urban frailty".
Introduction
How did pre-industrial economies react to extreme mortality crises like those caused by severe epidemics of plague? Were health shocks of this kind able to shape long-run development patterns? While past research focused on a very limited number of exceptionally severe shocks, like the Black Death (for example, Voigtlander and Voth, 2012) , this paper analyzes the consequences of what was by far the worst mortality crisis affecting Italy during the Early Modern period: the 1629-30 plague. For this later shock much more data is available compared to the Black Death, allowing us to study its impact on the development pattern of a large sample of Italian cities.
The consequences for the Italian economies of the 1629-30 plague are a long debated issue.
Most of the literature has argued in favor of a positive impact of the contraction in population as this would have implied a reduction in labor supply and hence an increase in wage with a consequent increase in living standards and long run growth (Malanima 2002; Malanima and Carpasso, 2007) . Recently, however, a re-evaluation of its demographic characteristics has led to formulate the hypothesis that this plague was the source of the relative decline of seventeenth-century Italy (Alfani 2013a . In this paper we take a different approach, arguing that the interaction between two waves of plague, i.e. the one in and the one in 1629-30, caused a productivity shock, worsening the trajectory of development of Italian cities. In this way, we add to previous studies empirical evidence on the hypothesis of a persisting negative effect of the plague.
In particular, after assembling a new database of mortality rates in a sample of cities, we estimate a model of population growth allowing for different regimes of growth. We found that cities affected only by the 1629-1630 plague recovered from the shock in the short run, whereas cities affected also by the 1575 wave showed a long run persisting effect (i.e. up to 1800) on the pattern of population growth. This heterogeneity in the effects of the plague is interpreted as further evidence of the hypothesis that plague waves may potentially be considered as determinants of the decline of economic regions or whole countries.
Plague waves in Early Modern Italy: an overview
During the first two centuries of the Early Modern period, Europe was still badly affected by plague. In the sixteenth century, frequent plague waves of varying intensity struck repeatedly all corners of the continent, however focusing on cities and highly urbanized areas. In the seventeenth century, endemic plague progressively disappeared from Western Europe. For example in England, the last epidemic striking London dates to (ending with the famous Great Fire), although isolated cases are recorded in the city until at least 1679 (Slack 1985, 68-9) . In the Low Countries, the last plague affecting Amsterdam occurred in 1663-64 (Duncan and Scott 2001, 331; Van Bath 1965) . In France, the last plague wave begun a few years later, in 1668, spreading to the northern parts of the country (Biraben 1975) . In central Europe plague lingered longer, until at least 1679, the date of the so-called 'Great Plague' of Vienna. 1 It has recently been suggested that during the seventeenth century southern Europe, and especially Italy, was much more severely affected by plague than the northern part of the continent. This would be due to higher mortality rates in the cities, and much more importantly, to a greater capacity of plague to affect rural areas as well as cities. In its turn, the damage done to the rural areas would also curb the potential for recovery of the cities, by destroying the demographic surplus traditionally produced in the countryside and which, in normal conditions, was continuously transferred to the cities (Alfani 2013a ). This characteristic of seventeenth century Italian plagues would differentiate them from both those affecting Europe in the same century, and from those affecting Italy in the sixteenth century (Alfani 2010a ).
Overall, sixteenth century Italy was affected relatively lightly by plague (Alfani 2013b) .
Even the worst epidemic, in 1575-77, was mostly restricted to cities and spread to a much more limited part of the Peninsula than the great seventeenth century plague waves. This is also the first plague that can be studied systematically, due to the presence of particularly abundant documentation as well as of a considerable amount of specific research. During the seventeenth century, one interesting characteristic of Italian plagues is that they never overlapped -in fact, we cannot mention any single community in the whole of the 1 A recent overview of seventeenth-century European plagues, including a discussion of the factors which could have led to the disappearance of endemic plague from the continent, is provided by Alfani (2013b) .
Peninsula affected more than once by a plague epidemic throughout the century 2 . What is more, in that period the number of plague waves affecting Italy is very limited: two main ones, in 1629-30 and 1656-57, to which a regional plague affecting only Sicily in 1624 has to be added (Alfani 2010a; Del Panta 1980) . Figure 1 details the territorial coverage of the four mentioned plague waves. During the seventeenth century the cities included in the figure were affected exactly once by the plague and additionally they could have been affected by the 1575-77 wave. This is of crucial relevance for our study since we argue that the interaction between the two waves was a factor undermining the growth process of the Italian cities.
[ Figure 1 ]
A brief description of each of the three plague waves relevant to this article is necessary.
1575-77:
although this was the most severe plague affecting Italy during the sixteenth century, its territorial coverage was limited compared to the later plague waves. It entered the peninsula from central Europe and the first Italian city to be affected was Trento, where the disease was present since September 1574. During spring 1575 the plague started to spread to much of Veneto, affecting all of the main cities of the Venetian Republic such as Venice, Padua, Verona and Vicenza. Later it infected a large part of Lombardy and Emilia but failed to cover the whole of the North and to spread to central and southern Italy, notwithstanding the fact that the epidemic lasted until 1577 and even lingered longer in certain areas (the last city affected, Genoa, was struck in 1579). In the same period, Sicily in southern Italy was also infected, but this was probably an independent plague epidemic which seemingly had reached the island onboard a pirate ship returning from northern Africa (Alfani 2013b, 89-93; Del Panta 1980) . Overall, the 1575-77 plague wave showed a markedly urban character as most rural communities were spared, including those placed in the territories of infected cities (Alfani 2010a; 2013b, 92-3) . 
Database
This article makes use of a new database of plague mortality rates for the whole of Italy in the period 1575-1700, thus covering all the major plague waves mentioned in the earlier section. The final and complete version of the database is used here for the first time and includes information about 49 Italian cities, among which all the main ones. This is by far the largest and most complete collection of plague mortality rates existing for Early
Modern Italy.
The information comes from a combination of sources, including state sources, chronicles, and micro-demographic reconstructions. For reasons of space, it is impossible to list here all the original material and the publications of reference. What is more, for many cities multiple estimates are available. All existing estimates have been collected and compared;
for the purpose of this article, only the most reliable have been retained. Precedence has been given to estimates resulting (in this order, when applicable): 1. from microdemographic reconstructions; 2. from information about both the pre-plague population and the number of plague victims; 3. from detailed local studies produced by historical demographers or social-economic historians; 4. from documentation produced by health boards or by other city-or state-level authorities; 5. from chronicles. Additional information present in the database includes the geographic position of each city, the State to which it belonged, its institutional status, and the size of its population at different points in time.
Figure 1 details the geographic position of all cities included in the database, and also provides information about which ones were affected by each plague wave. Table 1 charters descriptive statistics about local mortality rates during the three main plague waves.
[ Table 1 ]
The data presented in table 1 clearly shows a marked difference in mean/median urban mortality rates between the 1575-77 and both the 1629-30 and 1656-57 plague waves. This difference had already been described by recent works, which also pointed out that an even more significant difference is to be found in overall mortality across large areas, given the inability of the 1575-77 epidemic to spread pervasively to the rural areas (Alfani 2010a) . 
The economic consequences of the last Italian plagues: open questions
Recently plague started to recover, among economic historians, a popularity which it had long lost. The Black Death pandemic of the fourteenth century, in particular, has been pointed out as a possible factor favoring Europe over the main Asian economies, India and China in particular. According to Pamuk (2007) , the Black Death was a powerful exogenous shock capable of leading to a long-lasting increase in wages throughout Europe and to trigger institutional innovation, and consequently would lie at the root of the Great Divergence. The positive impact of the Black Death on European institutions and economic structures had earlier been underlined by scholars like Herlihy (1997) and Epstein (2000); the latter described the Black Death as an agent of "creative destruction" capable of moving the European economies to a higher growth path. Recently, Voigtländer and Voth (2013) showed, by means of a two-sector Malthusian model, how the demographic shock caused by the Black Death could have triggered a transition to a new steady state characterized by higher per-capita income. Crucial to this was not only the massive size of the population loss caused by the Black Death, but also the way in which it favored, indirectly and in association with other factors like the frequent wars, the enrooting in Europe of a demographic regime characterized by particularly high mortality. The latter point had also been made by Clark, who underlined the positive impact on European living standards of the new mortality regime shaped by the Black Death and the subsequent plague waves (Clark 2007, pp. 99-102) . Related to this, Malanima (2012) focused on the way in which the pandemic altered the functional distribution of income, favouring labour.
If the Black Death has attracted a significant amount of recent research, the same is not true for the subsequent plague waves. In general, economic historians have tended to consider late Medieval and Early Modern plagues as a kind of prolongation to the Black Death, capable of assuring the long-lasting impact of the initial shock but seemingly not much worthy of being studied in their own regards. Another general and quite widespread implication, is that late Medieval and Early Modern plagues were ultimately beneficial to the economies, Black-Death like, as they allowed for an increase in per-capita resources and higher wages. Finally, late Medieval and Early Modern plague has long been considered a kind of "great equalizer", striking now one area of Europe now another, but in the medium to long run affecting similarly all corners of the continent; also this implication seems to come from a bold generalization of the scholarship on the Black Death.
A recent comparative study of plague across seventeenth century Europe has argued that in such period, the disease affected very unevenly the continent. Italy in particular was struck very badly, with the loss of 30-35 per cent of the total population in the North and 30-43
per cent in the South (Kingdom of Naples), while in northwestern Europe plague intensity can be estimated to be in the 8-10 per cent range in England, in the 11-14 per cent range in France, and in the 15-25 per cent range in the Dutch Republic (Alfani 2013a, 4) . What is more, the damage done by the Italian plagues was very concentrated in time (one wave per area, see earlier sections) while elsewhere in Europe it amounted to the combined effect of many plague waves striking repeatedly the same area throughout the century. It has been argued that seventeenth-century plague had a displacement effect on the Italian economies, moving them to a lower long-term growth path, not a higher one like it is generally believed was the case for the Black Death (Alfani 2013a, 16-20) . This view contrasts with earlier literature on the economic impact of plague in Italy. Malanima, in particular, argued that even the seventeenth-century epidemics were beneficial in the medium-long term, as they improved the standards of living of the survivors (Malanima 2002, p. 345; Malanima and Capasso 2007) .
In this paper we contend the hypothesis that the plague has been beneficial for the Italian economies, and specifically for the urban economies, on the basis of a very intuitive argument. Let us assume that we can evaluate the living standards in an economy on the basis of observed wage, that is it is possible to describe the economy only on the basis of its labor market, as in figure 2.
[Figures 2, 3]
The basic argument proposed by Malanima and Carpasso (2007) is that the plague is a shock in the labor supply that, because of mortality, contracts from S to S', increasing wage of survivors (from w* to w*'). This line of reasoning, however, relies on the assumption that there is no change in productivity. To see the relevance of this assumption, let us consider figure 3 in which a shock in labor productivity shifts labor demand from D to D'.
In such case, there is no reason to assume ex ante that the plague has had a positive impact on wage, since its net impact will depend on the size of the labor supply shock relative to the productivity shock.
But why should the plague have had an impact on labor productivity? The reasons for such hypothesis are manifold and rely on the extensive and persisting demographic and economic effects of extreme health shocks. Possibly the most important factor is the damage done by the plague to the stock of human capital existing in northern Italy. As recently argued by Alfani (2013a) , mortality rates in the order of 300-500 per thousand implied the disease becoming a universal killer, no longer being a "plague of the poor" as This determined a shortage of skilled work available for the sophisticated manufactories which were the backbone of the northern Italian urban economies of the early seventeenth century. Already at the time of the 1575-77 plague, urban governments had some trouble in recovering the lost human capital, namely by means of measures favouring immigration of skilled workers -even against the will of the local guilds, like in Venice (Preto 1978, 117-18; Alfani 2013b, 107-9) . However, this could be done as other important Italian manufacturing cities were spared and the existing human capital could be re-distributed over a larger area. What is more, the fact that rural areas were generally not affected by this plague wave assured that unskilled labour was abundant and ready to move in to fill the gaps opened in the cities. This resulted in a widening gap differential in wages paid to skilled and unskilled labour (Pullan 1964, 416-17) . However, the great plague of 1629-30 had deeply different consequences, due to the fact that 1. it affected all the major manufacturing cities of central-northern Italy; 2. it affected rural areas as badly as the cities.
As a consequence, no incentive to skilled immigration could lure quickly the needed workers to a given city (as all cities were basically playing the same game), and even the traditional, steady unskilled immigration from rural areas was interrupted, for a time at least.
In his classic study of the consequences of plague on the Venetian labour market, Pullan holds that the 1629-30 epidemic "had created labour shortages crippling to industry" (Pullan 1964, 422) . Studies related to other cities suggest that the same was happening elsewhere, for example in Cremona (Andreozzi 2010) , while the available data on urban productions (especially textiles) show that the plague was able to displace the production trend to a decidedly lower path (Alfani 2013a, 18-19) .
Mass destruction of human capital can determine, per se, a serious productivity shock.
However, in the historical context of early seventeenth century Italy, it came to be associated with other factors detrimental to productivity. The 1629-30 plague affected the economies of the peninsula at the worst possible moment, that is when their manufactories were dealing with increasing competition from northern European competitors. As already mentioned, this event was very unlike the Black Death as it affected specific areas of the continent much more severely than the others (many of which were entirely spared); this is why it could have had a general displacement effect (Alfani 2013a) . From the specific point of view of the cities, the plague favoured two processes detrimental to the urban economies: the transfer of capitals from the manufactories to investments in lands, which seemed to offer better opportunities and safer revenues; and the transfer of part of the productions from the cities to rural areas, where they were also able to escape the rigidities of the guild system. We will discuss later these developments; what needs to be pointed our now, is that both processes tended to reduce the availability of capital for the urban manufactories -the other factor which could have caused a serious negative shock to productivity.
Having clarified some of the reasons why plague could have proved detrimental to the economy, this article will now contribute to the ongoing debate about the actual consequences of severe epidemics by providing a novel empirical test of whether plague was able to displace the Italian urban economies, and whether displacement led to a higher or a lower growth path. The focus will be placed especially on the 1629-30 epidemic, the worst one affecting the richer part of the Peninsula, but as will be seen the interacting effects of the 1575-77 and 1629-30 plagues are possibly the most important explanations for different local outcomes. Changes in city size will be used as an indicator of economic growth (or decline) over the long run, as is common procedure in the literature on historical urban economics literature (Bosker et al., 2008; Percoco, 2013a Percoco, , 2013b .
Methodology
In previous sections we set out our hypothesis that the plague of 1630 had significant and persistent effects on relative city size growth. In this section, we present our methodological approach by building on the seminal paper by Davis and Weinstein (2002) , further applied by Brakman et al. (2004) who based their analysis on a new economic geography framework in which if a shock is small, then the economy recovers to the initial stable equilibrium. If the shock is large enough, then the economy converges to a new equilibrium.
Let us consider a process of relative city size growth in the form: Where s it is relative size of city i at time t, i.e. it is the ratio between city population and total Italian population. i Ω is a long run equilibrium around which city size oscillates given an error structure given by equation (2) Where the dependent variable is the growth rate in relative size of city i between 1650 and 1700, whereas g i1600-1650 is the growth between 1600 and 1650, in a period comprising the effect of the 1630 plague. In equation (4) In order to identify the shock imposed by the plague in 1630, we need to estimate equation (4) by means of an instrumental variable procedure. This is because g i1600-1650 is a noisy proxy for the shock imposed by the 1630 plague.
To this end, we propose the use of the logarithm of mortality rate for the plague in 1630 as an instrument to identify parameter β .
For the aims of this article, we focused on the cities for which acceptable estimates of the population size at 50-years intervals since at least 1600 were available or could be produced. The resulting sample consists of 35 cities across the Italian peninsula (see Appendix).
Results
Methodology presented in the previous section postulates the estimation of a system of equations following a two step procedure. and 3 we control also for the status of capital city (with a moderately significant and positive coefficient) and for the geographical macro-area in which the city is located. In model 3 we control also for the plague in 1575 (as a dummy variable) and find no significant effect. Further to be noted is the fact that the coefficient for the South is not significantly different from zero, indicating that the South did not experience differential negative growth across the period, probably because the area was not affected by the 1630 plague.
[ Table 2 ]
In table 3 we report estimates of second stage regressions. Model 1 reports a coefficient associated to cumulative growth over the period 1600-1650 equal to -0.868, indicating, according to the model presented in the previous section, that the plague of 1630 had a permanent effect. The coefficient maintains its sign and significance also in models 2 and 3, although with smaller magnitude. Interestingly, when our dependent variable is cumulative growth over the periods 1650-1750 and 1650-1800 (models 4 and 5), the effect of the shock occurred over the period 1600-1650 loses significance. The same is true for the effect of the plague of 1575 which was found significant in model 3. What is more, in model 3, when we introduced the dummy for the 1575 plague, magnitude and significance of the effect of the 1630 shock decreased substantially, indicating a potential interaction between the two events. Note however that the coefficient related to all demographic shocks stays negative throughout the models. Interestingly, the coefficients associated to South are always negative (although not always significant), indicating a negative differential growth across the period not dependent on the 1630 plague (but possibly due to the 1656-57 plague).
[ Table 3 ]
In table 4 we test explicitly for an interaction between the plague of 1575 and the shock to relative city size in 1600-1650 due to the plague. To this end, we have divided our sample into two groups: one comprising the cities affected by the 1575 plague and one comprising the cities not affected by that epidemic. Models 1 and 2 report estimates of the model when the dependent variable is cumulative growth over 1650-1700. Interestingly, the coefficient associated to cumulative growth in 1600-1650 is significant and equal to -0.539, hence indicating a permanent effect, only for the cities affected by the plague in 1575. This persisting effect is relatively absorbed across the centuries, since the coefficient declines moderately when we consider growth in 1650-1750 and 1650-1800 (models 3-6). It should be noted that the coefficient for the growth in 1600-1650 is never significant for the cities not affected by the plague in 1575.
[ Tables 4 and 5] As a robustness check, in table 5 we have excluded cities in the South as for those cities the process of decline has started well before the cities in the Centre-North and also because the plague of 1575 has not affected cities in the South. To be noted is the fact that our results do not change significantly and the coefficient of interest is only slightly smaller than estimates in table 4, but always comfortably in the interval (-1,0), indicating a strong persistence of the shock effects.
Discussion
Our regression analysis confirmed what has recently been hypothesized about the ability of plague to displace economies to lower growth paths -and not always, or not necessarily, to higher ones as has been argued by many earlier works dedicated to the Black Death epidemic. Consequently, our analysis confirms that the economic consequences of severe demographic shocks need to be understood and studied on a case-by-case basis, as the historical context in which they happened can lead to very different outcomes.
More generally, our analysis offers a novel perspective on the timing and the causes of the relative decline of the central and northern Italian economies compared to other areas of Europe. At the end of the sixteenth century and in the early seventeenth, these economies were still very strong as stated by the most recent overall evaluation of the Italian economic trend during the Early Modern period (Alfani 2013b ) and consistently with the revisionist literature which for some decades has been developing the notion of "relative decline" to describe the Italian fortunes during the seventeenth century (Sella 1997; Lanaro 2006 ).
According to Malanima (2006) , the century when Italy as a whole faced its deepest crisis centuries were clearly separated by a fall (a 'catastrophe') in the population and in product, for which the plague was mainly responsible" (Alfani 2013b, 173) . Later he demonstrated that plague had a deeply different demographic impact across seventeenth century Europe, and developed an "epidemiological hypothesis" to explain the origin of the relative decline of the most advanced areas of Italy compared to northern Europe (Alfani 2013a) . This article provides support to this hypothesis, demonstrating that plague had a permanent negative effect on many key Italian cities, particularly those already exposed to the 1575 wave.
The decline of the urban economies and especially of their manufacturing sector -possibly triggered, as we argued, by a negative productivity shock caused by plague -needs to be better placed into perspective, as one fundamental argument put forward by those who introduced the notion of relative decline, and notably by Sella (1997) , is that during the seventeenth century production moved, to a degree at least, from the cities to the rural areas. This allowed to make use of the abundant labor present in the country and to escape the rigidities of the urban guild system. However, in the medium and long run it also implied a re-focusing of the northern Italian manufacturing sector on the production of semi-finished and of lower-quality products. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, when demographic recovery after the plague was completed, the northern Italian states were unable to recover also the position of centrality in the European economy which they had enjoyed up until the eve of the plague. The decline of their cities, which is reflected in urbanization levels lagging behind those of a century earlier (in the centre-North of the Peninsula, urbanization rates can be estimated at around 14.4% in 1600 and 13% in 1700. Malanima 2005, 106) , is clearly an essential explanatory factor of this ultimate failure to keep the same pace as the most dynamic areas of Europe. To put it bluntly, we should not forget that a relative decline is however a decline.
One final point to be underlined, is that our regression analysis provides strong support for the need to consider together the 1575-77 and 1629-30 epidemics, as seemingly it was their interaction, much more than the local intensity of the 1629-30 outbreak, which explained different outcomes across the cities included in our database. This is an entirely novel finding, which is worthy of being further explored by future research as it might lead to a significant revision of the way in which we think about the economic consequences of epidemics. We will tentatively introduce the notion of frailty, which is commonly used in demographic and health studies to describe an individual's relative risk of death compared to other members of a population (Vaupel 1988) . Among the determinants of frailty, there are the health conditions experienced in earlier life periods. Similarly, we can hypothesize that the susceptibility of a city to suffer permanent negative effects from an epidemic depends on having it experienced or not an earlier severe epidemic. The implication is that an epidemic could reduce the economic "health" of a city in such a way as to make its economic structures "frail", a condition which could prove undetectable with the indicators usually employed to study long-term economic dynamics in the past. If a subsequent exogenous health shock occurred, frail cities would be affected more severely than nonfrail cities, even at parity in mortality rates (and consequently, at parity of apparent severity of the mortality crisis).
In our analysis, we have paid particular attention to the labour market. It is not totally clear how the labour market could be made "frail" by a health shock, unless we think at factors like a non-inexhaustible ability of the manufacturing sector and the guild system to import skills from the outside (the huge intake of foreigners following the 1575-77 epidemic could have limiting effects on the possibility to attract more after the 1630 crisis), the ratio of production of new skills locally (the way in which plague affected the apprenticeship system, for example), the ability of labourers to rely on local networks to get different forms of help and protection, an ability that we could think to depend on the amount of time spent in the city (skilled workers migrating to a city after 1575 might have found themselves more exposed to the risk of dying in 1629-30 than those residing in place from before 1575 or than the children of long-time dwellers inheriting their parents' network).
All these, however, are only tentative and provisional explanations for a fascinating phenomenon which could be fully understood only by means of new historical research.
Conclusion
This article provided an overview of the demographic impact of plague on Italian Early
Modern cities, from the 1575-77 epidemic up until the last great seventeenth century plagues. It introduced the largest-existing database of urban mortality rates in plague years, allowing, first, to demonstrate the particularly high severity of the last Italian plagues (in the two final waves, mean mortality rates in cities were in the order of 400 per thousand), and secondly, to analyze their economic impact.
In this regard, the article made use of the methods of economic geography to study the ability of a mortality crisis to alter the growth path followed by a city. It found evidence that the 1629-30 plague affecting Tuscany and northern Italy, in particular, was able to displace some of the most dynamic and economically advanced Italian cities, like Milan or Venice, moving them to a lower growth path. Demonstrating that the plague had a permanent negative effect on many key Italian urban economies, the article provided support to the recently-formulated hypothesis that the origins of the relative economic decline of the northern part of the Peninsula have to be found in particularly unfavorable epidemiological conditions. More generally, the article provided a useful new perspective on Italian long-term economic trends, including aspects like the enrooting of a North-South divide, the falling-back of northern Italy compared to its main European competitors, and the final consequences of the progressive "ruralization" of the Italian economies during the seventeenth century.
Finally, the article introduced the notion of frailty, applied to labour markets and to economic structures in general, to understand how the consequences of an epidemic could in fact depend on earlier health shocks. This idea opens the way for a new understanding of how epidemics might have affected preindustrial economies in the long run. 
